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Exporting United States Drug Law: An
Example of the International Legal
Ramifications of the W a r On Drugs"

Any doubt regarding the Bush Admigistration's commitment to its highly publicized 'War on Drugs" disappeared on
the night of December 19,1989, as more than 20,000 American
soldiers swarmed across Panama. The massive military effort
was justified by a federal grand jury indictment against alleged
drug trafficker and fugitive Panamanian strongman Manuel
~oriega.' The invasion, then the biggest U.S. military operation since Vietnam; raised a worldwide chorus of condemnation. Yet the Panamanian occupation is merely the latest drugrelated step in a trend that dates back decades. One commentator has suggested that our countrg's three largest exports are
now "rock music, blue jeans, and United States law." The extraterritorial enforcement of United States law has led to a
plethora of practical and theoretical problems: not the least of

1. See George J. Church, Showing Muscle With the Invasion of Panama, a Bolder-and Riskier-Bush Foreign Policy Emerges, TIME,January 1, 1990, at 20. While
there were certainly other considerations that led President Bush to take this action, one of the principle justifications voiced by the Administration was Noriega's
alleged involvement with Colombian drug lords and his outstanding indictment in
the United States.
2. Id.
3.
V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The E&aterritorial Application
of United States Law, 14 INISL LAW. 257 (1980).
4.
One problem facing the courts is the degree of constitutional protection afforded non-U.S. citizens concerning actions taken by the federal government outside
the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)
(holding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to search and seizure by US. agents
of property owned by a non-resident alien located in a foreign country).
One commentator has noted two practical problems being faced as a result of
the extraterritorial enforcement of United States laws. He explains that:
In recent years, federal criminal prosecutions, like so much contemporary civil litigation, have become increasingly complex and frequently
dependent upon evidence gathered outside the United States. . .

....
. . . Certainly the legacy of the

.

Warren Court was one emphasizing,
defining and, perhaps, inventing defendant's rights. Many of those legislatively and judicially mandated protections were doubtless necessary. Their
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which is the potential violation of international law by administrative agencies anxious to enforce their portion of the domestic
criminal code? Indeed, as one commentator explains, "the drug
war is one of great political complexity fought on many
fronts?
This comment examines some of the international ramifications of United States extraterritorial criminal law enforcement. Part I1 sets forth the international law of drug enforcement as codified in multinational treaties and solidified by a
United Nations convention. Part 111recounts the history of the
so-called 'Drug War'' currently being waged by the United
States and summarizes the current focus of federal drug enforcement efforts. Part IV examines an example of conflict between United States drug policy and international law by discussing recent legislative efforts to expand the Coast Guard's
jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas. Part V
addresses the practical, diplomatic, and philosophical problems
posed by the United States' ever-expanding criminal law enforcement presence in foreign countries and at sea. This comment concludes that the international drug war cannot be won
until domestic demand for drugs decreases.

Efforts to suppress non-medical narcotics usage and trafficking are not confined to the United States. Several international conventions sought to curtail illegal drug traffic through
treaties and agreements in the first half of the twentieth century.' Despite isolationist pressure, the United States became

result, however, has been to shield further the international criminal, his
reliance upon domestic protections coupled with offshore secrecy has made
the pursuit of such violators arduous and their identification and conviction often impossible.
S. Cass Weiland, Congress and the Tkansnational Crime Problem, 20 INPI, LAW.
1025, 1025-34 (1986).
5.
This problem is not a new one. See, e.g., George Schwarzenberger, The
Problem of an Internutional Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEGALPROBS. 263 (1950)
(setting forth the problems of extraterritorial enforcement of domestic laws in the
first half of the twentieth century).
6.
TELEGRAPH,
Jan. 11,
Neil Darbyshire, The World War on Drugs, THEDAILY
1990, at 17.
7. Some of these early treaties include the following: 1) International Opium
Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. 612; 2) Agreement Concerning the
Manufacture of, Internal Trade in and Use of Prepared Opium, Feb. 11, 1925, 51
L.N.T.S. 337; 3) International Opium Convention, Feb. 19, 1925, 8 1 L.N.T.S. 317;
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a party to three of the multinational conventions: The Hague
International Opium Convention: the Geneva Convention for
Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs: and the Lake Success Protocol.1o The most
important issue facing these conventions seems to have been
reaching an agreement on a suitable definition of "illicit narcotics" so that the worldwide control effort could be unified.
However, diverse religious customs and usage traditions presented a situation where one nation's menace was another
nation's pastime." This created problems for any concerted
effort t o curtail drug production and trafficking and prevented
the conventions from producing an effective international drug
enforcement treaty.
Due t o the ineffectiveness and lack of focus of these early
treaties, the United Nations held a 1961 conference "For the
Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs" (Single
Convention).12 The Single Convention, which recognized "that
addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the
individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to
mankind,"13 is generally regarded as the present-day international law of drug enforcement.'* The United States was both
a major instigator and a signatory to both the Single Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1972, which added slight

4) Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. 863; 5) Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East, Nov. 27, 1931, 177 L.N.T.S. 373; and 6)
Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs,
Dec. 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230, 62 Stat. 1796, T.1A.S. 1671, 1859.
8. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. 612.
9.
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. 863.
10. Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic
Drugs, Dec. 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230, 62 Stat. 1796, T.1A.S. 1671, 1859.
11. Diversity of custom with regard to controlled substances can even be found
within the United States. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990) (case deals with the sacramental use of peyote by
Native Americans in contravention of a criminal prohibition on the use of the hallucinogenic).
12. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter Single Convention], as amended,
March 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.1A.S. No. 8118, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Geneva Protocol].
13. Id. at 1409.
14. There are, of course, other rules of international law that touch upon extraterritorial police activity. Some of these, such as the Law of the Sea, will be treated below.

amendments.l5
The greatest success of the Single Convention is its widely
accepted list of controlled or controllable substance defintions.l6 Based upon this substance list, the Single Convention
requires each party nation to furnish annual necessity estimates for expected medicinal, religious, and scientific use for
each controlled narcotic."
The thrust of the Single Convention is individual sovereign
responsibility. The substantive provisions essentially commit
party nations to unilaterally stop the illegal manufacture, importation, exportation, and use of drugs within their own territories." Thus, by setting controls and by encouraging each
nation to make educated estimates on its medicinal and scientific drug needs, the Single Convention attempts to fight drug
smuggling on a manageable, national level.
However, because the international community assumed
that party nations would accept their individual responsibilities
in good faith, no provision of the Single Convention authorizes
or prohibits international enforcement or extraterritorial police
action by any nation or by the United Nations collectively. In
light of this fact, United States anti-drug efforts have veered
toward extraterritorial enforcement.

15. As of January 1, 1990, the following Western Hemisphere nations were parties to the 1972 Geneva Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs:
Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. El Salvador is a party to the Protocol, but not
IN FORCE,U.S. DEPV OF STATE,351-52 (1990).
the Single Convention. TREATIES
16.
Schedule I lists 78 drugs that are completely subject to all controlling sections of the Single Convention. Schedule I1 lists another 7 substances that are
more readily medicinal and are therefore less controlled. Single Convention, 18
U.S.T. at 1559-61.
The listings of controlled substances set forth in the Single Convention were subsequently amended by the 1972 Geneva Protocol, supra note 12, which reaffirms the
substantive provisions of the earlier agreement.
17. Among the internationally illegal drugs specified in the Single Convention's
provisions are: opium, coca and its progeny (cocaine, crack, etc.), and cannabis.
Single Convention, 18 U.S.T. at 1419-21. The Convention also obliges all parties to
"limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture,
export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of [the listed] drugs."
Id. at 1413.
18. Article 31 provides that: "The Parties shall not knowingly permit the export
of drugs to any country or territory except: (a) In accordance with the laws and
regulations of that country or territory; and (b) Within the limits of the total of
the estimates for that country or territory as defined [by the country]." Id. at 1422.

EXPORTING U.S. DRUG POLICY

Despite the publicity and political rhetoric, the ReaganBush "War on Drugs" is nothing new. President Richard Nixon
predated the current emotional battle by declaring a drug war
of his own.lg In addition, Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald
Ford both directed substantial efforts to curtail the flow of
drugs into the United States.

A. History of United States Drug Enforcement Efforts
Federal government suppression of illicit narcotics in the
United States actually dates back to the registration and revenue provisions of the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 (Harrison
The Harrison A d regulated the sale and use of narcotics, such as opium and cocaine, by taxing their consumption
and importation. Heightened fears of the hannfid effects of
narcotics led t o increasingly stringent amendments to the Harrison Act, as well as the passage of other, more restrictive meas u r e ~ By
.~~
the mid 19208, "there was no legal source of cocaine [or other opiate narcotics] in the United States for nonsurgical use."22
The federal government continued to fight the consumption
of drugs, but found that large quantities were being imported
into the United States from other nations. Because of this troubling trend, the United States subscribed to several of the early
The United States was one of the
multinational ~onventions.~~
major instigators of the Single Convention, and U.S. drug enforcement officials eagerly anticipated international consensus
on the drug problem.2"
However, it soon became apparent to United States officials that the Single Convention did not provide the weaponry
necessary to wage an international drug war. The ideal behind
the Single Convention is that each nation wage the drug war
own borders. This unilateral control approach falwithin
-

See generally EDWARDI. EPSTEIN,AGENCYOF FEAR (1977).
Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (the Ad was codified into the
Internal Revenue Code in 1939).
21.
Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War On Cocaine: The Futility and D e s t m tiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIS.L. REV.1305, 1312-14 (1983).
22.
Id. at 1313.
23.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24.
See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
19.
20.
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tered because drug suppression was apparently a much higher
priority in the U.S. than in the other Single Convention nations. Particularly discouraging to United States' efforts was
the lack of enforcement in those developing countries that supply the majority of illicit narcotics. Despite the signatory promises of these "producer" nations to reduce drug trafficking,
illegal narcotics smuggling continued to increase worldwide.
To combat this trend, the United States entered into a
number of criminal enforcement treaties with other n a t i o d 5
These bilateral treaties typically include provisions for the
extradition to the U.S. of accused criminals in the custody of
party nations.26 Although these treaties had many other useful purposes besides the fight to curtail drug trafficking, the
narcotics control value of such treaties was appreciated by
Even with the extradition treafederal government offi~ials.~'
ties i n place, however, "the obstacles to effective suppression of
[illicit drugs] a t the source seem[ed] as insuperable as the barriers to enforcement within the United state^.'^'
One of the major offensives in President Nixon's drug war
was the formation of a new agency to deal with the narcotics
problem. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the
principle drug enforcement agency of the federal government,
DENS mission is principally to wage
was created in 1973.~~
See generally Kevin Fisher, Note, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Con25.
trol: Slamming the Stable Door After the Horse Has Bolted, 16 N.Y.U. J . OF IWL
L. & POL. 353 (1984).
The United States has greatly expanded the number of bilateral extradition
26.
treaties to which it is a party. Between 1960 and 1969, the United States was a
party to extradition treaties with the following nations: Brazil, Israel, Kenya, Malawi, Singapore, and Sweden. Id. at 366-67 11.90.
Between 1970 and 1978, however, the Unites States concluded treaties with the
following sixteen countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, France,
Germany, Italy, Kiribati, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Tuvali, and the United Kingdom. Id.
27.
See Oversight Hearings on Federal Dncg Strategy: Hearings Before the
House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 381
(1979) (statement by Irving Nathan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Justice Department).
28.
Wisotsky, supm note 21, at 1335. The "barriers" include an ever-increasing
demand for illicit narcotics within the United States, social acceptance of some
drug usage, shrinking drug enforcement budgets in many jurisdictions and the
increasing difficulty in gaining convictions for drug related criminal conduct.
29.
Id. at 1352. While DEA as an entity is relatively new, its history dates
back to enforcement of the Harrison Narcotics Ad of 1914, when 162 IRS
collectorlagents were assigned to the Miscellaneous Division to enforce the revenue
provisions of the Act. Id. at 1352 11.253. DEA is currently an arm of the FBI,
although both agencies enjoy a remarkable amount of autonomy. It has been noted
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the drug war at home and abroad through information gathering, surveillance, procuring evidence, and actual enforcement of
United States drug laws.30
B. Recent Drug Enforcement Efforts and Current Focus

The current overseas control policy of the United States
operates within a framework of foreign assistance legislation,

that this freedom often causes the two organizations to cross jurisdictions. For an
extended history of DEA function delegation, see id.
30.
DEA activities in the United States are very similar to those of the FBI.
DEA extraterritorial activities, however, are markedly different fiom those undertaken by any previous organization. DEA has described its international assistance
activities as follows:
A. Criminal drug information collection and exchange directly support
intelligence production and prosecution of defendants in the United States
and the host countries. These efforts include:
-Development of sources of information knowledgeable of illicit cultivation, production, and transportation activities.
-Undercover penetration of traflhking organizations in support of
host country operations.
-Suweillance assistance and development of evidence against major
tr&ckers of drugs destined for the United States.
-Provide host countries with information for effective enforcement
programs.
-Participation with foreign officers in pursuing investigative leads.
-Coordination of matters regarding extraditions, expulsions, joint
prosecutions and requests for judicial assistance.
-Acquisition and transmittal to the United States of drug samples
supplied by foreign government officers for laboratory analyses to determine the origin of drugs destined for the United States.
B. Traditional drug intelligence activities conducted overseas concurrently with the foregoing involve the identification and dissemination of
information collection requirements, collection against these requirements
by special agents, initiation of Special Field Intelligence programs, analytical research processing, and the production and dissemination of
tacticalloperational and strategic foreign intelligence.
C. Liaison, which is central to the DEA foreign mission includes visits, briefings, exchanges and contacts with foreign law enforcement officials to encourage cooperation and development of effective host country
drug enforcement capability and commitment.
D. DEA conducts a variety of international training programs which
are funded by the Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotic
Matters: Five-week Advanced International Drug Enforcement schools,
two-week in-country training schools, two to four week executive obsewation programs, instructor training programs, intelligence collection and
analysis schools, three-week forensic chemist seminars, and sponsor the
International Drug Enforcement Officers Association Conferences.
Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, and the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 632-33 (1982).
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international law, and the above-mentioned bilateral agreeThe various organiments with narcotic producing countrie~.~'
zations fighting the influx of drugs have repeatedly stated that
crop control is the "fwst priority."32 This philosophy has led to
"intensified programs intended to suppress the drug at its
source by destroying illegal coca plants" and encouraging the
development of substitute crops.33 Congress has appropriated
billions of dollars in economic and military aid to this effort,
using such aid as an incentive for the cooperation of the financially struggling Latin American countries that contribute most
heavily to the production of drugs.*
During recent episodes of the drug conflict, "war" has become the most appropriate designation. While only the Coast
Guard participated in the enforcement of drug laws abroad
throughout the 19708, military force became a more viable and
usable option to the Reagan and Bush Administrations. The
military branches participated in a series of jungle strikes
against Bolivian drug manufacturers in 1986.35 The Coast
Guard's role and jurisdiction have also expanded.
The use of military force by nations to suppress the importation of narcotics is international in scope. As one newspaper
recently reported:
With the Royal Navy on cocaine patrol in the Caribbean, SAS
and American military advisers assisting enforcement agencies from the jungles of Peru to the mountains of the northwest frontier, and [the 20,000-plus] regular U.S. troops [formerly] occupying Panama, anti-drug measures have been
elevated from disparate local policing actions to a series of
major military actions. Even satellites and the latest Star
Wars technology are used to spot illicit crops.'

The drug barons have responded to this concerted attack on
their power base with military offensives of their own."
31.
Wisotsky, supra note 21, at 1335.
32.
See Intenational Narcotics Control: Hearings Before the House Comrn. on
Foreign Aftcairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1982) (cited in Wisotsky, supm note 21,
at 1335 11.144).
33.
Wisotsky, supm note 21, at 1335.
34.
See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
35.
See Paul Berg, Drugs and Rights,. President% War Faces Legal Challenges,
WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1986, at Z9; Juan de Onis, Bolivia Leader Asks 'Global Approach' on Drugs, LA. TIMES, July 25, 1986, 8 1, at 25, col. 1.
36.
Darbyshire, supra note 6, at 17.
Id. The report continues,
37.
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Somewhere in this expansion of extraterritorial police
activity, United States policy was bound to confront the restraining principles of customary international law. One of the
areas in which U.S. policy apparently conflicts with international law is in the exercise of jurisdiction over stateless vessels.

A major emphasis of the Nixon Administration's drug war
was to increase the Coast Guard's participation in the enforcement effort. The Coast Guard continues to be a major player in
the drug crackdown today. Because this participation often
involves enforcement activity on the high seas, basic principles
of international jurisdiction are involved.38
The central conflict is between the long-standing notion
that vessels are free to navigate the waters of the high seas,
and the equally compelling duty of nations to protect citizens
from evils that may lurk beyond territorial boundaries. In this
sense, the struggle over the United States' drug enforcement
policy on the high seas captures the essence of the tension
between domestic and international law.

A. General Jurisdictional Principles
Professor Henkin has summed up the law of the sea, writing that "[flor hundreds of years the basic principle of the law
of the seas has been freedom. With i b r beneath it-has been
the principle that the sea belonged to everyone, or to no
one."39
The 1958 United Nations Convention on the High Seas

In Colombia the heavily armed cocaine cartel made an audacious declaration of war on the Government. In Peru, Burma and Sri Lanka the barons have linked with guerrilla armies fighting to overthrow the governments. In Afghanistan the opium fields are protected by local warlords,
once supplied with arms by the U.S.In Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries, drug money is a major contributor to the war effort-in
Laos heroin smuggling is government policy.

Id.
38.
The questions presented are basic to the concept of international law, and
the philosophical side of these questions is considered below. See infh notes 84-92
and accompanying text.
39. Louis Henkin, Changing Law for the Changing Seas, in USESOF THE SEAS
69, 70 (Edmund A. Guillin ed., 1968).
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("Convention") echoes this sentiment by stating that "[tlhe high
seas [are] open to all nations," and "no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its s~vereignty."~~
The codification of this principle by the Convention has been ratified
and signed by the United States.'"
Despite this far-reaching principle, nations occasionally
extend their jurisdiction beyond their borders. In Rivard v.
United state^:^ the Fifth Circuit announced the following five
basic international principles upon which nations traditionally
assert extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: (1) the passive
personality principle, (2) the nationality principle, (3) the universality principle, (4) the territoriality principle, and (5) the
protective principle.43Based upon one or more of these principles, nations just* extending their jurisdiction over individuals beyond national boundaries and the normal reach of domestic law enforcement.
The "passive personality principle" provides for jurisdiction
when the victim of a crime is a state citizen? This jurisdictional basis recognizes the interest nations have in protecting

Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314,
40.
450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Convention]. Article 2 further provides that:
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down
by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
1) Freedom of navigation;
2) Freedom of fishing;
3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
Id.
41.
Despite the Convention's universal language, courts in the United States
have held that its provisions do not apply to everyone. In United States v. Monroy,
614 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit held that where a vessel was determined to be registered in a country which had not signed the Convention on the
High Seas (in this case Panama), neither the defendants boarded and arrested by
the Coast Guard nor the Republic of Panama could raise restrictions of the treaty
on the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas as a bar to
prosecution. See gemrally Andrew W . Anderson, Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels
on the High Seas: An Appraisal Under Domestic and Intenational Law, 13 J . MAR.
L. & COM.323 (1982).
42.
375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967).
43.
Id. at 885.
44.
Peter D. Clark, Criminal Jurisdiction over Merchant Vessels Engaged in
International lhde,11 J . MAR. L. & COM.219, 221 (1980).
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their citizens throughout the world. While the U.S. could
stretch this doctrine to justify extraterritorial police activity by
classifying the victims of drug trafkking as U.S. citizens, passive personality is not currently recognized by the United
States.
The "nationality principle" provides for jurisdiction when
the perpetrator of the crime is a citizen of that natiod5 While
states may not normally make arrests within the territory of
another state, arrests made on the high seas based upon this
principle are generally considered legal? This principle theoretically aids the prosecution of U.S. citizens overseas, but by
definition does not just* the arrest of aliens outside United
States territory.
The "universality principle" gives a nation jurisdiction
when the criminal offender is within the custody of that nation,
wherever the crime took place. Port countries generally avail
themselves of this category. The theory is that the port country
is in a better position to enforce its criminal laws than another
en tit^.^' Universally condemned crimes, regardless of the
crime locale, may be punished by any nation if that state has
custody of the offender." Should the United States adopt this
jurisdictional theory, an argument could be made that drug
trafficking is a "universally condemned crime" under the Single
Convention of 1961.~~
The "territoriality principle" extends jurisdiction when the
criminal act either takes place within the territory of a given
country, or when the effects of the act harm that c0untry.6~
United States courts have cited this theory as a major justification of extraterritorial jurisdiction over drug smugglers on
the high seas and elsewhere.'l The reasoning may stem from
federal criminal legislation that defines drug usage and trafficking as "a specific threat to the security and societal well-

45. Id. at 220.
46. Id. at221.
47. Id. at 222.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
50. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885-86 (5th Cir.); Clark, supra note
44, at 220.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other g r o u d , United States v. William, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc).
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being of the United state^."^^ As such a threat, international
enforcement is supposedly justified.
Finally, the "protective principle" gives a jurisdictional
basis to laws enacted by a nation that prohibit extraterritorial
acts that either threaten that nation's security or somehow
interfere with a government's proper functioning.53 The concept is that actions which threaten sovereignty or security may
be punished by the threatened state. It is possible that mere
semantic shifting (for example, codification of the perceived
"threat") may invoke the protective principle. By using the
words "specific threat to the security" of the United States, the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act effectively accomplishes
this.54

B.The Stateless Vessel Problem
Due largely to the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations'
increased monetary commitment to the war on drugs, the Coast
Guard used its extra equipment and manpower to become more
effective in apprehending traffickers during the 1970s. Unfortunately, the fixit of this heightened activity was negated by
technical legal factors. One commentator summed up this period of the drug war by noting that
[als the Coast Guard became more and more proficient at
intercepting smugglers by stationing vessels at the 'choke
points' in the Caribbean, the tide had turned against the
Federal prosecutors in the courtroom. While the Coast Guard
was beginning to win the 'Drug War' on the high seas, the
lack of adequate legal weapons was turning the prosecutorial
fight into a rout."

One of the thorns in the side of United States drug enforcement efforts is the use of stateless vessels by drug smugglers.
Traffickers often "risk not registering their ships or flying any
convenient flag to elude detection" and frustrate prosecution."
Beginning in the 19708, marijuana smugglers employed a distribution technique known affectionately as the "mother ship"
52.
46 U.S.C. 5 1902 (1990).
53.
Clark, supra note 44, at 221-22.
54.
46 U.S.C. 5 1902 (1990). For an argument that illicit drugs pose no such
security threat, see Wisotsky, supra note 21.
55.
Anderson, supra note 41, at 325.
56.
See generally Patrick Sasek, Note, Jurisdiction Over Drug Smuggling on the
High Seas: It's a Small World After All, 44 U. PPLT. L. REV. 1095, 1098 (1983).
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method:
[A] large ship, typically a converted fishing vessel, meets
smaller powerboats . . . at a designated point in waters off the
United States coast. Even fblly loaded, the powerboats can
outrace the vessels in the Coast Guard fleet. The mother ship
may cruise or simply float in international water until its
cargo is delivered. Though often unregistered, or registered in
a different country than indicated, the mother ship is made to
appear properly identified to take advantage of the principle
of undisturbed navigation on the high seas. Unless the Coast
Guard follows internationally accepted practice, its seizure of
a foreign ship in international waters violates the most h d a mental rule underlying freedom of the seas, that no nation
may assert sovereignty over the high seas."

This method is still used today as a major trafTkking device,
and drug smugglers continue to raise violations of international
law as a defense when apprehended on the high seas. In particular, they argue that freedom of navigation is a fundamental
right, respected by all nations and dating to antiquity; during
most of the 19708, United States c o w s agreed.58 Thus, the
problem of stateless vessels escaping criminal responsibility
plagued drug enforcement efforts until Congress took steps to
eradicate the problem.
C. The Congressional Response
Generally, the Coast Guard defines its jurisdiction precisely as ordered by either the President, as Commander in Chief,
or Congress, under the common defense and general welfare
power. Several recent bills manifest congressional intent to
toughen maritime drug laws and ultimately expand the reach
of the Coast Guard and other drug enforcement agencies. One
such bill was the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act
of 1970 ("Comprehensive Act")," which repealed the prior
hodgepodge of criminal drug legislation and "consolidated all
Federal law in the area into one act.&'
This consolidation created a major problem for the Coast
Guard. Due to congressional oversight, all laws regarding pos57.
Id.
58.
See Anderson, supra note 41, at 324-26.
59.
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
60.
Anderson, supra note 41, at 324.

Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
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session of illegal drugs aboard U.S. vessels on the high seas
had been repealed by the Comprehensive Act without being
subsequently replacede6'Under federal drug enforcement statutes valid shortly after passage of the Comprehensive Act, drug
smugglers apprehended on the high seas could only be charged
with "conspiracy to import drugs into the United state^.'^
However, because this change requires proof of intent, it was
mcult for federal prosecutors to prove their cases.63
A . equally diacult problem was that of asserting United
States jurisdiction over foreign nationals aboard foreign vessels." Although such arrests on the high seas were seemingly
within several general principles of extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction,B5 United States courts often dismissed charges
against foreign smugglers. Noting a general distinction between
arrests made within United States territory, and those made
on the high seas, many courts typically premised the dismissals
on the notion that Congress had not expressly justified the
expansion of jurisdiction beyond U.S. territorial waters? Low
conviction rates on high seas arrests had a chilling effect on
drug prosecutions. For example, difficulty of conviction forced
the United States Attorney's Office to decline prosecution in
almost fifty percent of the seizures made by the Coast Guard
during the period between September 1, 1976 and March 28,
1979.~'
Congress finally remedied the situation by amending the

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. A good example of this problem is the case of the Panamanian freighter
Don EmiZio, which was found to be hovering just outside United States waters
with 70,000 pounds of marijuana on board, but prosecution was declined for lack of
proof of the intent of the 24 crew members to introduce the marijuana into the
United States. Anderson, supm note 41, at 325 (citing Hearings on H.R. 2538
Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. 64) (statement of Michael P.
Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Southern
District of Florida).
64.
65.
In particular, the territoriality and protective principles could be applied.
See supm notes 41-53 and accompanying text (discussing principles of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction).
66. Anderson, supra note 41, at 325.
67.
See id. at 326 (citing Hearings on H.R. 2538 Before the Subcomm. on Coast
Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
96th Cong., 1st Sess 65 (1979) (statement of Michael P. Sullivan, Assistant United
States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Southern District of Florida)).
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Comprehensive Act in 1980.68A new section explicitly prohibited "any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
on the high seas, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or
distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute,
a controlled substance.*9 The same restrictions applied to any
United States citizen on board any vessel.70
Congress further expanded the Coast Guard's high seas
reaching power by proclaiming that a "[vlessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States' includes a vessel without
nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality . . . ."?' This definition could be easily criticized as an
unreasonable expansion of United States influence and as violative of the long-standing principle of freedom of navigation.
Congress subsequently repealed section 955a, and then in
1986 replaced it with a provision that asserts even more jurisdiction over the high seas. As mentioned above," the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act (MDEA) declared that "trafficking
in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem and is universally condemned," and that it "presents
a specific threat to the security and societal well-being of the
United state^."?^
Official federal government entities realize that the present
MDEA may violate international law. The State Department
has cited the United Nations Convention of the High Seas and
specifically noted the potential international ramifications, but
nevertheless endorsed the MDEA. It advised that
under international law a country may not assert jurisdiction
over a vessel of another country sailing on the high seas except in rare circumstances. . . . There is also an exception
which allows us to board a vessel on the high seas which is
without nationality, that is one which is not registered in a
foreign state or which can be assimilated to a vessel without
nationality under paragraph 2 of article 6 of the Convention
on the High Seas . . . .
While ordinarily the United States does not favor a unilateral extension of jurisdiction by the United States over the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

21 U.S.C. 5 955 (1988).
Id. 8 955a(a) (1982).
Id. 8 955a(b)(1982).
Id. 8 955b(d) (1982).
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
46 U.S.C. $ 1902 (1988).
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activities of non-US. citizens on board stateless vessels without proof of some connection to the United States, the serious
nature of this problem, and the fact that persons on board
these stateless vessels are engaged in narcotics trafficking
aimed a t the United States, warrant an extension in this
particular case. . . . The Department of State strongly supports the intent of [this Act]."

The United States continues to assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas when those vessels appear to be
involved in illegal activities.

D. Explaining United States Policy and Actions
Courts and official agencies have given a number of seemingly valid justifications for the expansion of jurisdiction. As
noted above, two internationally recognized bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction (the territoriality and protective principles)
revolve around the definition of "threat" to either sovereignty
or security." The territoriality principle justifies jurisdiction
based upon foreign activities having potential effects within a
state, while the protective principle justifies actions to eradicate definite, specific threats to the state. Governments are
clearly entitled to define what they consider "a threat" and to

Anderson, supra note 41, at 334 (citing Hearings on H.R. 2583 Before the
74.
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. 55-56 (1979) (statement of Morris D.
Busby, Director, Office of Ocean Affairs, OES Bureau, Department of State). The
"rare circumstances" contemplated by the State Department here are those listed in
Article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas, which provides, in relevant portion,
that:
1 . . . . [A] warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the
high seas is not justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable
ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the
ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the [above situations], the warship may proceed to verify the
ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the
command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after
the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration.
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 2318, 450 U.N.T.S.
82.
75.
See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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protect themselves against the menace, so long as the protective actions do not violate the sovereignty of other nations.
Similarly, customary international law has adapted to
protect the maritime rights of all nations. As one commentator
has observed, "[tlhe high seas are not res nullius, subject to the
jurisdiction of no nation, but res communis, subject to the common jurisdiction of all nations."" This spirit of mutual protection has spawned the custom of vessel registration.
It has long been established "that the only conclusive evidence of the nationality of a vessel is found in the documents
required by international law and custom to be furnished by
the flag state and carried aboard the
One scholar
has noted that a vessel's documentation by the issuance of
appropriate papers establishing her true nationality "is older
than international law itself and extends back before the era of
~ ~maritime nations presently require some
the ~ o m a n s . "All
kind of vessel registration." The current adoption of this ancient principle is embodied in Article 6 of the United Nations
Convention on the High Seas.''
Registration of ships serves many purposes: safety control
over each nation's fleet, state protection of individual vessels
and sailors, identification for communication between ships,
and organization for the various requirements of the general
maritime law and any civil claims that may arise on the sea.
Perhaps the most important reason is that the order of the seas
depends upon registration. One article notes the necessity of
strict adherence to this practice:
Every ship is required to have a national character and scant
protection is afforded to ships which have no nationality . . . .

76.
Anderson, supra note 41, at 336.
77.
Id. at 339.
78.
Rienow, The Test of the Nationali6y of a Memhant Vessel, 155 (1937).
Id.
79.
80.
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 2315, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 (1958). Article 6 provides in relevant portion:
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or
in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas . . . .
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using
them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may be
assimilated to a ship without nationality.
Id.
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...
So great a premium is placed upon the certain identification of vessels for purposes of maintaining minimal order
upon the high seas . . . that extraordinary deprivational measures are permitted with respect to stateless ships. Thus, it is
commonly considered that ships either having no nationality
or falsely assuming a nationality are almost completely without prote~tion.~~

Legislative actions that expand jurisdiction over stateless
vessels on the high seas actually follow a principle of American
jurisprudence. In United States u. Cortes,8' the Fifth Circuit
seemed to agree with the above quoted passage and said that
"[s]tateless vessels are not entitled to the same protection afforded vessels registered in a foreign nation which is a signatory of the [High Seas] Con~ention."~~
This distinction between the rights afforded registered
vessels and the rights of stateless vessels, although widely
accepted, is hardly universal. Many critics argue that jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas is "inimical t o the
exercise of freedom of the seas by United States commercial
vessels and threatens the country's security and governmental
functions."*
An argument could be made that freedom of navigation is
an individual rather than a national right, and that mariners
who choose t o sail without the protections and conveniences of
a home port should be dlowed to do so without harassment.
While convincing from an individual right's standpoint, this
argument appears t o have been soundly rejected by the international community. "Although . . . it is an acknowledged violation of international law for one nation to enforce its law within the sovereign territory of another nation without permission,
the wrong is one under international and not domestic law.""
A person arrested under such circumstances cannot raise the
defense when brought before U.S. courts. The action arguably
violates the sovereign integrity and jurisdiction of the foreign

81.
Myres S. McDougal et. al., The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the
Nationalitly of Ships, 54 AM. J. INT'LL. 25, 27, 76-77 (emphasis added).
82.
588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979).
83.
Id. at 110. The Seventh Circuit followed the same rationale and reached a
similar result. See United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1979).
84.
Anderson, supra note 41, at 338.
Id. at 329.
85.
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nation and the defense is for that nation to raise." Similarly,
freedom of navigation over the high seas is generally considered a right granted to all nations, which then funnel the right
to individual citizens upon any condition set by the sovereign.
From a practical standpoint, rejection of the "individual
freedom of navigation" argument reflects the wisdom of the
ages. The principal beneficiaries of this "right," if acknowledged, would be those likely t o be involved in piracy, drug
trafficking or other maritime mischief. The widespread international custom of vessel registration poses quite an inconvenience to such persons.
Thus, we may conclude from the authorities and international treaty law that expanding jurisdiction over stateless
vessels on the high seas is a legally acceptable leap for the
United States t o make. Problems with jurisdiction over stateless vessels is just one legal problem facing prosecutors of the
drug war. Other problems include dual criminality and R.I.C.O.
issues that the courts are still attempting to resolve. Beyond
the legal questions loom other problems that must be recognized and dealt with.
WITHTHE EXTRATERRITORIAL
WARON DRUGS
V. PROBLEMS
Despite seemingly spectacular successes, manifested
through increased confiscation tonnage and arrest rates, the
drug war in South America is not going well.87 There are
practical, diplomatic, and philosophical problems that need t o
be addressed in any honest appraisal of the drug war.

A. Practical Problems
Critics of the drug war point at discouraging statistics and
argue that we are waging an international war that cannot be
won. 'We are not so much fighting a war as weeding a garden,"
one experienced Customs officer explained in a recent newspaper article. "At least in a war," he continued, "the enemy can be
killed. With drugs, it seems that no sooner have you knocked
out one opponent than another one steps up to take his
place?

86. Id.
87. Joseph B. Treaster, Faltering Drug War: The Flow from Latin America-4
Jan. 1, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
Special Report, N.Y.TIMES,
88.
Darbyshire, supra note 6 , at 17.
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The war is often painted as a vast chess game with multibillion dollar consequences. 'The dramatic expansion in the size
of the black market," writes one commentator, "demonstrates
the inability of domestic law enforcement agencies to suppress
the importation of [illicit narcotics] into the United state^."'^
For every law enforcement move there is a smuggling
countermove. Smugglers often respond to Customs actions "by
using counter-intelligence, decoy shipments, and such disinformation as false 'tips7.'*'
Another problem in this age of deficit-consciousness is the
price tag of the drug war. President Bush's recent campaign to
stop cocaine at its source includes $2 billion in economic aid to
Peru, Bolivia and Colombia over four years. In addition, the
plan includes $261 million in aid mainly to the military and
police in those ~ountries.~'This policy of discouraging drug
production may eventually produce some desired results. However, the consensus among critics is that the plan is a financial
di~aster.'~
To these economic aid "incentives" we must add the
price of military advisers and combat personnel used in many
drug enforcement operation^.^^ Similarly, the frightening and
costly increase in federal and state court docket congestion
directly results from the recent escalation of drug prosecutions.
The cost in time, judicial resources, and money for the courthouse machinery can be immense. Needless to say, the drug
war is not without its disadvantages. Some of these costs enter
into our diplomatic relations.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Wisotsky, supra note 21, at 1334-35.
Id. at 1350.
Treaster, supra note 87, at 1, col. 1.
Professor Wisotsky writes that:
In the very long term, of course, it is possible that the development
of a modern socioeconomic infrastructure will transform the conditions of
life in Andean Peru and Bolivia and thereby facilitate the control of coca
and cocaine production. Failing such a transformation, however, neither
the United States nor the source countries can achieve significant limitations on the supply of coca for cocaine without resorting to some radical
or violent technical "fix" such as military occupation of the coca-growing
regions. Even then, it is doubtful whether the weak governments involved
have the political and economic power to sustain such repression over the
long term.
Wisotsky, supra note 21, at 1347.
93.
See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Fires On Ship Believed Carrying Drugs
Mexico,
L.A. TIMES,Feb. 1, 1990, at Al, col. 4 (recounting an unsuccessful two and onehalf hour Coast Guard barrage on a Cuban owned, Panamanian.flagged vessel that
avoided boarding).
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B. Diplomatic Problems
The drug war is responsible for furthering the diplomatic
woes of the United States in its relations with developing countries. Particularly with the nations of Central and South America, the drug war is often viewed as yet another attempt by the
coloso del norte to impose its will upon the sovereignty and
dignity of its neighbor nations. For example, the attack on
Panama successfully felled Noriega but alienated Peru, a far
more important player in the drug
Even among our South American "drug allies" there is
great dissent. It is becoming increasingly clear that for the
Andean nations, cutting cocaine production and exports is by
no means their number one pri~rity.~'Few analysts realistically believe that these nations have the manpower, equipment
or desire to wage war on their own citizens who often depend
on coca and marijuana crops as their sole economic subsistence.' While we cannot win the drug war alone, South and
Central American nations are unwilling to win it for us

C. Philosophical Problems
Back in 1950, one commentator observed that international
law is, by definition, dependent upon the whims of popular
political ideol~gies.~'
This holds true today. It has been argued
that because the premises are always changing, international
law is viewed as an ineffective tool to deal with the problems of
nations.98

94.
Citing disapproval of the United States military action, Peru pulled out of
an Andean summit meeting with President Bush and briefly halted an anti-drug
effort with the United States. Efforts to improve the U.S. working relationship
with Peru have thus far failed to completely rectify a situation that was far more
favorable in the weeks preceding the Panamanian occupation. See Treaster, supra
note 87, at 1, col. 1.
95. Id.
96. See generally Wisotsky, supra note 21 (noting the economic factors which
provide incentives to Latin American farmers to produce drug producing plants
such as coca).
97.
Schwarzenberger, supra note 5, at 263 ("International lawyers-with the exception of those immunised [sic] by the atmospheric conditions prevailing in the
legal departments of Foreign Offices-are prone to suffer from a professional disease against which other members of the legal profession are remarkably immune.
They appear to be highly susceptible to current fashions in the realm of political
ideology").
98. See JOSEPH
M . SWEENEY
ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGALSYSTEM1261-
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International law often poses little restraint on actions
taken by the United States. Indeed, U.S. courts may (and often
do) disregard international law when it conflicts with domestic
law.g9 The Fifth Circuit exemplified this attitude in United
States v. Howard-Arias.''' The court stated that "[tlhe United
States may violate international law principles in order to
effectively carry out this nation's p~licies."'~'While this attitude is not demonstrative of all opinions, other courts have
enunciated similar rules when domestic policies conflict with
international law.lo2
Legislative language is no more supportive of international
legal principles. The Maritime Drug Enforcement Act mandates
that "failure to comply with international law should not divest
a court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a defense to any
proceeding under [the Act]."1o3
This observed rejection of international law by Congress
and the judiciary is by no means absolute. The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations notes that "Courts in the United
States are bound to give effect to international law and international agreements . . . ."lo4 Generally, courts in the United
States do everything possible to construe domestic law in a
manner consistent with international law, and vice-versa.lo5
When such a construction is not possible, courts must bow to
the constitutional will of Congress.
Perhaps the most important and far-reaching detriment to
the drug war is the effect that unilateral jurisdiction expansion
will have on the international legal system itself. Justice
~ r a n d e i sonce warned that "[ilf the Government becomes a

93 (3rd ed. 1988).
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 FSupp. 1161, 1178
99.
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
100. 679 F.2d 363, 371-72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982).
101. Id. at 371-72.
102. See Leasco Data Processing Eqyip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2nd Cir. 1972); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D.COM. 1925); The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
103.
46 U.S.C. $ 1903(d) (1988).
104. RES~ATEMENT
RELATIONSLAW OF THE UNITEDSTATES$
(THIRD)OF FOREIGN
111(3) (1987).
105. See, e.g., The Over the Top, 5 F.2d a t 842 ("[U]nless it unmistakably appears that a congressional act was intended to be in disregard of a principle of
international comity, the presumption is that it was intended to be in conformity
with it") Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) ("[Aln Act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains").
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law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."lo6 While he
was speaking specifically about the sovereign breaking domestic laws, the reasoning is equally apposite to an international
law context.
In a system where custom is the generally accepted practice, any radical change in that custom is actually formative of
the new customary law. This is true in every aspect of international jurisprudence. Every nation that violates a principle of
customary law changes that law somehow. Perhaps the violation in question is so egregious that the world community resolves never again to allow such a violation, and the law changes due to that resolution. More commonly, however, a nation
violates a principle of the accepted practice, only to see the
violation duplicated by other nations. Soon more nations ignore
the "ancient" custom and determine their own policy regarding
the rapidly disintegrating legal principle. Finally, wholesale
disregard for the former order quickly replaces the principle
with either a different custom or "international anarchy" as to
that principle.
Particularly malleable is the law of the sea. The changing,
dynamic nature of the law of the high seas was noted by Professor McDougal, who obsemed that
the international law of the sea is not a mere static body of
rules but i s rather a whole decision-making process . . . of
continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response,
in which the decision-makers or particular nation states unilaterally put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting character to the use of the world's seas, and in which other
decision-makers . . weigh and appraise these competing
claims in terms of the interests of the world community and
of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them.
As such a process, it is a living, growing law . . . .lo'

.

Because the international law is a "living, growing law,"
United States actions, even if technically legal, must be
couched in policies that emphasize patience and restraint. Undoubtedly, other decision-makers from other nations will either
106. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
107. Myres S. McDougal, Editorial Note, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the
Znternutional Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J.
L. 356, 356-57 (1955) (emphasis
added).
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resist or follow the United States lead in this area. Whichever
action the world community chooses to take, the international
law of the sea will be unavoidably and forever altered.

.

THENEEDTO ~ D U C EDEMAND
FOR DRUGSWITHIN
THE UNITEDSTATES
The focus of the United States drug war also raises problematic issues. Although the purpose of this comment is not to
present a plan for waging the war, a few thoughts may be
appropriate as an epilogue. The plague of drugs is truly frightening. Indeed, we fear losing an entire urban generation to the
ravaging effects of addiction. Yet despite the crisis and o u r
vigorous denouncement of the drugs-for-pleasure trade, we
clling doggedly t o the cultural hedonism which morally underwrites our drug use. Hence, the drug war movement conspicuously smacks of "buck-passing." A cultue that places a premium on "relaxing" and "getting away from it all" should not be
surprised when the young, innovative minds of that society
simply find more effective ways to reach the perceived goal.
The answer, however, will not be found in the siren calls
for legalization. The legalization of narcotics would lead to
disastrous results, fueled by the inevitable enormous increase
in drug use. In turn, this would lead to similar increases in
drug-related and drug-affected crimes, accidents, and
untreatable addiction.'" In addition, legalization implicitly
admits a moral defeat that would breed a general disrespect for
the law.'' Contrary to the academic view in support of legalization, narcotics abuse is not a victimless crime. Drug use,
particularly with the more powerful narcotics such as crack
and heroin, often leads to dangerous results for the user, the
user's family, and the c~rnrnunity''~Much drug-related crime
is directly tied to the use of drugs rather than their sale or
acquisition. Legalization, therefore, only encourages the tragedy*

108. Bruce Fein & William B. Reynolds, Drug Legalization, One Dopey Idea,
LEGALTIMES, Jan. 15, 1990, at 22.
109. See id.; see also, Gordon Witkin, Cops Under Fire, U.S. NEWS& WORLD
REPOW,Dec. 3, 1990, at 32.
110. See, e.g., Fein & Reynolds, supra note 106 (reporting that "a D.C. mother
had murdered two of her children and attempted strangulation of a third after an
exhilarating session with crack cocaine").
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Elementary economics suggests that a supply of drugs will
be available so long as there is demand. Therefore, any attempt
to solve the drug problem must confront demand by enlisting
both the private and public sectors, by educating existing and
potential drug users, and by tirelessly enforcing the drug laws
already on the books. But the plan must also address the contradiction of a society that welcomes whiskey, yet condemns
cocaine. To inquisitive children and teenagers, the line between
'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' mind-altering substances is
fuzzy, a t best. Until our society deals with such contradictions,
drug t r f i c k e r s will continue, with or without the approval of
the international community, to fill our communities with dangerous drugs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Extraterritorial enforcement of United States drug laws is
not working. Because the United States has been unable to
stop the influx of illicit narcotics a t its borders, law enforcement agencies have extended the battlefield beyond those borders. The United States currently uses a variety of international legal justifications to extend U.S. jurisdiction over the
high seas in order to prosecute the drug war. The Coast Guard,
the D.E.A., and other federal entities have become involved in
this battle that critics argue is unwinnable.
The problem is not one of manpower, ships, money or prosecutorial tools, however. The problem is one of moral inconsistency and economics. As long as the American appetite for
crack, cocaine, marijuana and heroin remains ravenous, there
will be a drug war to fight. When demand and hence profits
from illicit drug production, manufadure and traflicking cease,
the smuggling will stop. The drug war will have been won.
Until the drug war is won, unilateral expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in a drug effort that is unwinnable outside United States borders is foolish, costly and ultimately
damaging to the international legal system. Even though the
problem will never be wholly solved in Colombia, Bolivia or
Peru, international cooperation is still vital to overall success
and should continue to be sought. Jurisdiction over stateless
vessels on the high seas would be better expanded through
international dialogue and diplomacy rather than by Congress.
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Such an international process would allow all nations to participate in the formation of the "living, growing" international
law, and would enhance the comity of nations as well as the
order of the seas.
D. Brian Boggess

